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Abstract 
The aim of the present paper is to supply an elucidation of the concept of information in the 
communicational context. For this purpose, two traditional interpretations of the concept of 
information, the epistemic and the physical interpretations, will be distinguished, and their 
specific problems will be considered. In particular, whereas the epistemic interpretation misses an 
essential feature of communication, the physical interpretation faces difficulties in the quantum 
domain. The final goal will be to argue that the difficulties of the physical interpretation can be 
overcome by means of a manipulability conception of causation. 
1.- Introduction 
Since the mid-twentieth century, the word ‘information’ began to be increasingly present both in 
the everyday language as in the scientific discourse. With the explosion in telecommunications 
and computer sciences, nowadays it seems to be clear that “we live in the age of information.” 
However, there are few concepts whose meaning is as evasive as the concept of information. To 
borrow the words of St. Augustine: “If no one asks me, I know what it is. But if I wish to explain 
it to one that asketh, I know not.” Due to the elusiveness of the concept, any reflection about the 
matter should begin by discriminating the different senses of the term, and by delimiting the 
scope of the discussion. 
The first distinction that needs to be introduced is between a semantic and a statistical 
approach to information. The first approach conceives information as something that carries 
semantic content (Bar-Hillel and Carnap 1953, Bar-Hillel 1964, Floridi 2011) and, as a 
consequence, is related with semantic notions such as meaning, reference and truth. According to 
the statistical approach, information is concerned with the statistical properties of a system or 
with the correlations between the states of two systems, independently of any meaning or 
 2 
reference. In the present article the discussion will be confined to the domain of statistical 
information, although it does not imply to disqualify the attempts to add a semantic dimension to 
a statistical formalism (MacKay 1969, Nauta 1972, Dretske 1981). 
However, the focus on the statistical approach is not yet sufficiently specific. In fact, in the 
domain of statistical information different formalisms coexist and, often not sufficiently stressed, 
there are different contexts in which the concept of information is defined. In the traditional 
communicational context, information is primarily something that has to be transmitted between 
to points for communication purposes. In the computational context, by contrast, information is 
something that has to be computed and stored in an efficient way; in this context, the algorithmic 
complexity measures the minimum resources needed for an individual message can effectively be 
reconstructed (Solomonoff 1964, Kolmogorov 1965, 1968, Chaitin 1966). In this article we will 
deal only with the concept of information in the communicational context, in which the classical 
locus is Claude Shannon’s formalism, designed to solve certain specific technological problems 
(Shannon 1948, Shannon and Weaver 1949). 
The aim of the present paper is to supply an elucidation of the concept of information in the 
communicational context. For this purpose, two traditional interpretations of the concept of 
information, the epistemic and the physical interpretations, will be distinguished, and their 
specific problems will be considered. The final goal will be to argue that the difficulties of the 
physical interpretation can be overcome by means of a manipulability conception of causation. 
2.- Information in a communicational context 
As stressed above, although Shannon’s theory is the classical formalism to deal with statistical 
information in a communicational context, there are other formalisms that try to capture the 
concept of information from different perspectives. For instance, the Fisher information measures 
the dependence of a random variable X on an unknown parameter θ upon which the probability of 
X depends (Fisher 1925); the von Neumann entropy gives a measure of the quantum resources 
necessary to faithfully encode the state of the source-system (Schumacher 1995). Moreover, 
when information is linked with uncertainty, it is necessary to take into account that there is a 
general class of measures of uncertainty, of which the Shannon information is one member 
(Uffink 1990). 
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However, in spite of this formal multiplicity in the mathematical definition of the concept 
of information, there are certain minimum elements that can be abstracted to characterize a 
communicational context. In fact, from a very abstract perspective, communication requires a 
source S, which produces the information I(S) to be transmitted, a destination D, which receives 
the information I(D), and a channel C through which information is transmitted from the source 
to the destination. Both S and D are systems with a range of possible states, each one with its own 
probability, in terms which the amounts of information produced and received are computed; 
these amounts are usually, but not exclusively, measured in bits. The channel C can be 
characterized by means of the conditional probabilities that link the occurrence of the states of the 
source and the occurrence of the states of the destination. Although the success of communication 
is that all the information generated at the source, and it alone, arrives to the destination, in real 
situations this is not the case: equivocation E is the information generated at S but not received at 
D, and noise N is the information received at D but not generated at S; the so-called 
transinformation I(S; D) is the information produced at the source and received at the destination. 
Therefore, independently of the way in which the amounts of information are computed, the 
following relation holds: 
I(S; D)  =  I(S) − E  =  I(D) − N    (1) 
Thus, in real communications the goal is to reduce noise and equivocation to a minimum by 
improving the features of the channel to avoid information loss, and by including filters to block 
noise. 
In general, the information produced at the source is encoded before entering the channel, 
and decoded after leaving the channel and before being received at the destination. Claude 
Shannon (1948) and Joachim Schumacher (1995) have demonstrated theorems that supply the 
optimal coding in the classical and quantum case, respectively. Nevertheless, this aspect will be 
not central in the following discussion, which can be developed in terms of the minimum 
characterization of a communicational situation as presented above. 
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3.- Epistemic and physical interpretations of information 
Although there are several formalisms to deal with information in the communicational context, 
this is not the main source of disagreements about the meaning of the concept. In fact, even in the 
case of the adoption of a single formalism, there may be strong divergences about how the term 
‘information’ has to be interpreted. This is particularly clear in the case of the Shannon theory: 
the wide adoption of that traditional formalism does not imply interpretive agreement (see 
Lombardi, Fortin and Vanni 2015). 
In everyday life, often the notion of information is strongly related to the idea of knowledge: 
information supplies knowledge. When we read the newspaper, we get information about 
national and international events, and so we learn something that we previously ignored. In other 
words, information is something that modifies the state of knowledge of those who receive it. On 
this basis, it can be supposed that the link between information and knowledge is a feature of the 
everyday notion of information and not of the technical concept (see Timpson 2004, 2013). 
However, this is not the case: this epistemic interpretation of information is very commonly 
found in the philosophical and in the scientific literature. For instance, although taking Shannon’s 
theory as the underlying formalism for his proposal of endowing the formal concept of 
information with a semantic dimension, Fred Dretske establishes a close link between 
information and knowledge: “information is a commodity that, given the right recipient, is 
capable of yielding knowledge.” (1981, p. 47). This means that information is always in 
connection with a subject that learns something by means of it: “A state of affairs contains 
information about X to just that extent to which a suitable placed observer could learn something 
about X by consulting it” (Dretske 1981, p. 45; for an analysis of Dretske views, see Lombardi 
2005). Also with the purpose of incorporating a semantic dimension to the statistical formalism, 
Donald MacKay claims that information is linked to an increase in knowledge on the receiver’s 
side: “Suppose we begin by asking ourselves what we mean by information. Roughly speaking, 
we say that we have gained information when we know something now that we didn't know before; 
when ‘what we know’ has changed.” (MacKay 1969, p. 10). Although devoted to the research in 
formal and philosophical aspects of information based logics, Jon M. Dunn also defines 
information from an epistemic perspective as “what is left of knowledge when one takes away 
believe, justification and truth” (2001, p. 423). 
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Also some physicists tend to implicitly adopt this epistemic view when they speak about 
what we know or may know when dealing with information. For instance, in a traditional 
textbook about Shannon’s theory applied to engineering, it can be read that information “is 
measured as a difference between the state of knowledge of the recipient before and after the 
communication of information.” (Bell 1957, p. 7), and that it must be relativized with respect to 
the background knowledge available before the transmission: “the datum point of information is 
then the whole body of knowledge possessed at the receiving end before the communication.” 
(Bell 1957, p. 7). In the field of the attempts to give an informational foundation to quantum 
mechanics, Anton Zeilinger even equates information and knowledge when he says that “[w]e 
have knowledge, i.e., information, of an object only through observation” (1999, p. 633) or, with 
Časlav Bruckner, “[f]or convenience we will use here not a measure of information or knowledge, 
but rather its opposite, a measure of uncertainty or entropy.” (2009, pp. 681-682).  
These quotes are only some examples that show how often information is conceived in 
terms of knowledge. Moreover, this epistemic view has been applied in different technical 
domains, for example, in the attempts to ground a theory of knowledge on informational bases 
(Dretske 1981), or in psychology and cognitive sciences to modelize human behavior as an 
information-flow process (MacKay 1956) and to conceptualize the human abilities of acquiring 
knowledge (Hoel, Albantakis and Tononi 2013). 
When information is conceived  
From this epistemic perspective, a physical connection between the source and the 
destination is not required for the transmission of information. All that is needed is that the 
observer placed at the destination end increases his knowledge as the consequence of receiving 
the information sent from the source. Nevertheless, the probabilities that link the states of the 
source with those of the destination cannot result from mere accidental correlations. In fact, when 
the correlation between two variables is merely accidental, the value of one of them says nothing 
about the value of the other. For instance, even if the properties P and Q are perfectly correlated – 
i.e., every P is Q and every Q is P – this does not guarantee that we can know that ‘x is Q’ by 
knowing that ‘x is P’: if the correlation between P and G is a mere coincidence, x’s being P tells 
us nothing about x’s being Q. In other words, the mere correlation and even the exceptionless 
accidental uniformity do not supply knowledge. Therefore, the probabilities involved in the 
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communicational context are not de facto correlations, but manifestations of underlying lawful 
regularities. Indeed, commonly there is an elaborate body of theory that stands behind the 
attributions of probabilities (Lombardi 2004). 
A different view about information is the one that detaches the concept from the notion of 
knowledge. According to the physical interpretation, information is a physical magnitude, 
something that can be generated at one point of the physical space and transmitted to another 
point; it can also be accumulated, stored and converted from one form to another (Rovelli 1996). 
Although with no logical connection, this view appears strongly linked with the well-known 
dictum ‘no information without representation’: the transmission of information between two 
points of the physical space necessarily requires an information-bearing signal, that is, a physical 
process propagating from one point to the other. Rolf Landauer is an explicit defender of this 
position when he claims that “[i]nformation is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied 
to a physical representation. It is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a 
hole in a punched card, a mark on a paper, or some other equivalent.” (1996, p. 188). According 
to this view, it is precisely because of the physical nature of information that the dynamics of its 
flow is constrained by physical laws and facts: “Information handling is limited by the laws of 
physics and the number of parts available in the universe” (Landauer 1991, 29; see also Bennett 
and Landauer 1985). When appealing to the concept of information to elucidate the notion of 
scientific observation, Peter Kosso states that “information is transferred between states through 
interaction.” (1989, p. 37). The need of a carrier signal sounds natural in the light of the generic 
idea that physical influences can only be transferred through interactions. 
From this physical perspective, the relation between information and knowledge is not 
essential, since the transmission of information can be used only for control purposes, such as 
operating a device at the destination end by modifying the state of the source. Of course, this does 
not mean that information conceived as a physical magnitude cannot supply knowledge; it can, 
but it is not defined in terms of knowledge. 
The physical interpretation is the usual view in communication engineering: traditionally, 
the main interest of engineers is to optimize the transmission of information by means of physical 
signals, whose energy and bandwidth is constrained by technological and economic limitations. 
And the channels have to be designed in such a way that they can transfer the required amount of 
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information; the capacity of a channel is measured in bits per second. To the extent that the unity 
of measurement of information is involved in the calculations side by side with the unities of 
traditional physical magnitudes, it is not easy to resist the temptation of conceiving information 
also as a physical magnitude. In turn, in the field of physics, the attempts to construct an 
objective interpretation of quantum mechanics on the basis of informational constraints (e.g. 
Clifton, Bub and Halvorson 2003, Bub 2005) may find conceptual support in the physical 
interpretation of information. 
By adopting the physical view, some authors conceive information as a physical entity with 
the same ontological status as energy (Stonier 1990, 1996). Others, more cautiously, consider the 
analogy between the historical emergence of the concept of information and that of the concept of 
energy (Rovelli, personal communication). In fact, in the context of strict Newtonian mechanics, 
the concept of energy is subsidiary to the dynamical description of a system; it is a sort of 
“adventitious” concept designed to measure the capacity of a system to perform a certain task 
−work−. However, the concept was gradually acquiring its own, not merely adventitious, 
meaning, and became one of the fundamental concepts of physics. The words of William 
Thomson in the nineteenth century already express clearly this transformation: “The very name 
energy, though first used in its present sense by Dr. Thomas Young about the beginning of this 
century, has only come into use practically after the doctrine which defines it had […] been 
raised from a mere formula of mathematical dynamics to the position it now holds of a principle 
pervading all nature and guiding the investigator in every field of science” (Thomson 1881, p. 
475). At present, energy, although not material, has acquired a substantial nature −in the 
Aristotelian sense− in some physical domains, and plays a central unifying role in physics: 
energy is a magnitude essentially present in absolutely all contemporary physical theories; it is 
conceived as something that can be generated, accumulated, stored, processed, converted from 
one form to another, and transmitted from one place to another. Mutatis mutandis, in the light of 
the relevant role played by the concept of information in present-day physics, it is not difficult to 
suppose that it is following a historical trajectory analogous to that followed by the concept of 
energy in the nineteenth century physics: from initially being a tool designed to describe what we 
can do with material systems, the concept of information is progressively acquiring an 
independent and unifying physical content. 
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4.- Epistemic interpretation versus physical interpretation 
The difference between these two interpretations of information is clear: if there is no interaction 
or physical signal between source and destination, from the physical view there is no 
transmission of information between them, whereas the epistemic view does not prevent such a 
transmission (see Lombardi, Fortin and Vanni 2015). In turn, this difference is not a mere 
irrelevant detail, but has important consequences regarding the view of certain traditional 
philosophical problems. Let us consider the case of the characterization of scientific observation. 
By rejecting causal and anthropocentric approaches to observation in science, an important 
philosophical tradition explains scientific observation in informational terms. In order to 
elucidate the notion of observation without resorting to perceptual matters, Dudley Shapere 
proposes the following characterization: “x is directly observed (observable) if: (i) information is 
received (can be received) by an appropriate receptor; and (ii) that information is (can be) 
transmitted directly, i.e., without interference, to the receptor from the entity x (which is the 
source of information)” (Shapere 1982, p. 492). From a similar perspective, Harold Brown says: 
“To observe an item I is to gain information about I from the examination of another item I*, 
where I* is an item that we (epistemically) see and I is a member of the causal chain that 
produced I*” (Brown 1987, p. 93). With a terminology more familiar to physicists, Kosso 
appeals to the concept of interaction: “The ordered pair <object x, property P> is observable to 
the extent that there can be an interaction (or a chain of interactions) between x and an 
observing apparatus such that the information ‘that x is P’ is transmitted to the apparatus and 
eventually conveyed to a human scientist” (Kosso 1989, p. 32). By contrast with the causal 
account of observation, this view makes it possible to recognize situations observationally 
equivalent but causally different, and situations causally identical but informationally different 
which, for this reason, represent different cases of observation. It is quite clear that, given this 
view of scientific observation, much burden falls on how the concept of information is interpreted, 
and this becomes particularly evident in the case of negative experiments. 
Negative experiments were originally proposed in the context of the problem of 
measurement in quantum mechanics (Jammer 1974, pp. 495-496). In a negative experiment, an 
event is supposedly observed by noting the absence of some other event. The typical example is 
the case of neutral weak currents, which are observed by noticing the absence of charged muons 
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(see discussion in Brown, 1987, pp. 70–75). Nevertheless, negative experiments can be analyzed 
independently of quantum physics. Let us consider a tube in whose middle point a classical 
particle is emitted towards one of the ends of the tube; a detection device is placed at one of the 
ends, say the right end A, in order to know in which direction the particle was emitted. Since 
there is a perfect anticorrelation between both ends of the tube, by looking at the right end A, we 
can know the state at the left end B. Nevertheless, the instantaneous propagation of a signal 
between A and B is physically impossible. Let us now suppose that, after a sufficient time the 
device at A indicates no detection:  immediately we can conclude that the particle was emitted 
toward the left end B. But the question is: have we observed the emitted particle? The answer 
given from an informational approach to scientific observation depends on the interpretation of 
the concept of information adopted. Since there is a perfect anticorrelation between the two ends 
of the tube, by looking at the state –presence or absence of the particle– at the right end A, one 
can know the state –absence or presence, respectively– at the left end B. Therefore, according to 
the epistemic interpretation, there is an informational channel between the two ends of the tube, 
which allows us to observe the presence of the particle at B, even though there is no signal 
between B to A. The physical view, by contrast, leads us to a concept of observation narrower 
than the previous one: since there is no physical interaction between the ends A and B, by looking 
at the detector we observe the state at A, but we do not observe the state at B; such a state is 
inferred. 
Given that the difference between the epistemic and the physical interpretations of the 
concept of information is not merely nominal, it is necessary to consider the difficulties that they 
have to face when conceptually analyzed.  
5.- Epistemic and physical interpretations: difficulties 
The appeal of the epistemic interpretation lies in its resonance with the everyday use of the word 
‘information’, commonly linked with knowledge. However, conceptual difficulties arise in the 
technical domain. In fact, mutual information I(S; D) can be easily interpreted in epistemic terms, 
as a measure of the knowledge about the source obtained at the destination end. However, it is 
difficult to conceive the noise N and the equivocation E as measures of knowledge, since they are 
precisely obstacles to knowledge acquisition. In particular, noise can be generated outside of the 
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communication arrangement and has no relation with the source of information (think, for 
instance, in white noise in a radio receiver); therefore, it sounds conceptually dissonant to view it 
as carrying or yielding knowledge. A way out of this problem might be to consider that only the 
information I(S) produced by source, the information I(D) received at the destination, and the 
mutual information I(S; D) have to be conceived as measures of knowledge, but not noise and 
equivocation. But this answer would lead to admit the possibility of adding and subtracting 
variables referring to different kinds of items, in this case knowledge −or something that 
measures knowledge− and something different from knowledge (see, e.g., eq. (1)), a practice not 
allowed in mathematized sciences. 
The above difficulty is not the main trouble of the epistemic interpretation in the 
communicational context. Let us consider a TV transmitter T that broadcasts an electromagnetic 
signal to two television sets TVA and TVB. In this case, the correlations between the states of the 
two TV sets are not accidental, but they are the result of the physical dependence of the states of 
TVA and TVB on the states of T. However, there is no physical interaction between the two TV 
sets. Nevertheless, if the epistemic view is consistently adopted, it leads to admit the existence of 
an informational link between the two TV sets to the extent that it is possible to learn something 
about TVB by looking at TVA and vice versa: “If the statistical relations defining equivocation and 
noise between S and R are appropriate, then there is a channel between these two points, and 
information passes between them, even if there is no direct physical link joining S with R.” 
(Dretske 1981, p. 38). The set TVB may even be farther from the transmitter T than TVA, so that 
the states of TVB are later than those of TVA. Nonetheless, this is irrelevant from the epistemic 
perspective: despite the fact that the events at TVB occur later, TVA carries information about what 
will happen at TVB. 
This conceptualization of the above case sounds rather odd, and not because considerations 
about knowledge, but due to the communicational context in which the discussion is framed. In 
fact, whereas in communication the relationship between source and destination is asymmetric, 
the situation just described is completely symmetric: both TVA and TVB can indistinctly play the 
role of the source of information. This symmetry is a manifestation of the fact that nothing can be 
done, say, at the TVA end that will affect what happens at the TVB end. In other words, the change 
of the state of TVA cannot be used to control or modify the state of TVB. Communication, on the 
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contrary, establishes an asymmetric relationship between two systems: one is the source and the 
other is the destination, and communication implies that someone does something at the source 
that has consequences at the destination. Therefore, the epistemic approach to information misses 
something essential of the usual conception of communication. 
The case of the two TV sets is informationally analogous to the case of the EPR-type 
experiments, characterized by theoretically well-founded correlations between two spatially 
separated particles (Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 1935). In fact, here there is also an epistemic 
link between the two particles: measurements on one particle can be used, by means of the 
quantum correlations resulting from the original interaction, to generate predictions about the 
other. However, as it has been often repeated, information cannot be sent from one of the 
particles to the other because the propagation of a superluminal signal between them is 
impossible: there is no information-bearing signal that can be modified at one point of space in 
order to carry information to the other spatially separated point. These cases act as a silver bullet 
for the epistemic view, since they make clear that merely epistemic relations are not sufficient for 
communication. In other words, the epistemic interpretation of information, although based on a 
natural conception of information as linked to knowledge, loses its reference to the 
communicational context in which the information is defined. 
For the defender of the physical interpretation of information, on the contrary, the example 
of the TV sets and the EPR-type experiment support his position: both cases seem to make clear 
the need of a physical carrier of information between source and destination; it is this physical 
signal that allows us to say that what happens at the destination is the consequence of what 
happens at the source. This seems to tip the balance in favor of a physical interpretation of the 
concept of information. However, as always, matters are not so easy when quantum mechanics 
enters the scene. 
The paradigmatic and conceptually conflictive situation in the field of quantum information 
is the case of teleportation. Broadly speaking, an unknown quantum state χ  is transferred from 
Alice to Bob with the assistance of a shared pair of particles prepared in an entangled state and of 
two classical bits sent from Alice to Bob (the description of the protocol can be found in any 
textbook on the matter; see, e.g., Nielsen and Chuang 2010). In general, the idea is that a very 
large (strictly infinite) amount of information is transferred from Alice to Bob by sending only 
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two bits through a classical channel. The question is: “how does the information get from Alice to 
Bob?” (Timpson 2006, p. 596). It is quite clear that there is no physical signal by means of which 
the information contained in the quantum state can be transmitted. But it is also clear that what 
Alice does on his particle has consequences on what happens to Bob in another place.  
In order to give a physical answer to the question, Richard Jozsa (1998, 2004) conceives 
quantum information as a new kind of information, which has an amazing non-classical property: 
it may flow backwards in time. A similar opinion is expressed by Roger Penrose: “How is it that 
the continuous ‘information’ of the spin direction of the state that she wishes to transmit […] can 
be transmitted to Bob when she actually sends him only two bits of discrete information? The 
only other link between Alice and Bob is the quantum link that the entangled pair provides. In 
spacetime terms this link extends back into the past from Alice to the event at which the entangled 
pair was produced, and then it extends forward into the future to the event where Bob performs 
his.” (Penrose 1998, p. 1928). A different explanation is given by David Deutsch and Patrick 
Hayden (2000), who consider that the quantum information travels hidden in the classical bits 
sent by Alice to Bob. These rather bizarre answers to the question are implicitly tied to a physical 
interpretation of information: they insist on the search for a physical link, the signal that carries 
the information from Alice to Bob. Jozsa and Penrose think in a quantum channel. But since there 
is no quantum signal between Alice to Bob, then the channel extends towards the past up to the 
event at which the entangled pair was produced, and then towards the future. For Deutsch and 
Hayden, by contrast, the two classical systems that travel from Alice to Bob are the physical 
carriers of the information of the quantum state.  
In short, the physical interpretation faces conceptual difficulties in the case of teleportation. 
However, this does not imply a return to the epistemic interpretation, which could account for 
communication in teleportation but not in much simpler cases. Christopher Timpson cuts the 
Gordian knot of teleportation by adopting a deflationary view of information, according to which 
‘information’ is an abstract noun and hence does not refer to a spatio-temporal particular, to an 
entity or a substance (Timpson 2004, 2013; see also Duwell 2008). As a consequence, “there is 
not a question of information being a substance or entity that is transported, nor of ‘the 
information’ being a referring term.” (Timpson 2006, p. 599). From this viewpoint, asking for 
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how information gets from Alice to Bob makes no sense: the only meaningful issue in 
teleportation is about the physical processes involved in the protocol. 
Timpson’s stance dissolves the problem of the interpretation of the concept of information, 
rather than solving it. This view may sound strange to the physicists’ and engineers’ ears, since it 
forces them to admit that, in a situation of communication, there is nothing transmitted from 
source and destination, and that what is measured in bits/sec is not something physical. Then, it is 
worthwhile to consider whether the deflationist view is the only way out to the problem, in 
particular, whether there is a way of preserving a physical interpretation with no need of a 
physical carrier that travels through space. Perhaps the clue lies in the concept of causation: 
independently of the nature of the channel, communication would require that what happens at 
the source in a certain way produces, causes what happens at the destination. Moreover, the 
causal connection between source and destination would recover the asymmetry of the 
communication process. The main challenge of this strategy is the elucidation of the very concept 
of causation. 
6.- What causation? 
Although causation may offer a way out to the problem of interpreting the concept of information, 
the risk is to elucidate an obscure concept −information− by means of another even more obscure 
−causation−. In fact, the concept of causation is one of the most discussed topics in the history of 
philosophy; the difficulties that surround it have lead many authors to follow Humean ideas and 
to advocate for the “the complete extrusion” of the word ‘cause’ from physics (Russell 1912). Of 
course, we will not follow this path. 
Despite the long tradition of the counterfactual approaches to causation, if the purpose is to 
support a physical view of information, it seems reasonable to appeal to a physical conception of 
causation. From the physical perspective, causation has been conceived in terms of energy flow 
(Fair 1979, Castañeda 1984), physical processes (Russell 1948, Dowe 1992), or property 
transference (Ehring 1997, Kistler 1998). However, all these views involve physical signals or 
space-time connections and, as a consequence, they are not adequate to elucidate a concept of 
information that does not require a physical interaction between source and destination. 
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On the other hand, independently of any philosophical discussion, both in the everyday life 
as in science people act as if there were real causal links, without considering if there is a space-
time connection between the cause and its effect or not. Regarding causes, anyone distinguishes 
the case of pain on a finger due to a hammer blow from the appearance of the paperboy when the 
sun rises. Similarly, a chemist clearly distinguishes the causal action of a catalyst in increasing 
the rate of a reaction from the mere correlation between the melting point and the color of an 
element.  
The manipulability accounts of causation intend to capture this intuitive distinction. Their 
basic idea is that it is possible to draw the distinction between cause-effect relationships and mere 
correlations by means of the notions of manipulation and control. Nancy Cartwright (1979) 
stresses this central feature of causation: causal relationships are needed to ground the distinction 
between effective and ineffective strategies; an effective strategy proceeds by intervening at a 
cause in order to obtain a desired outcome. In a similar vein, Thomas Cook and Donald Campell 
hold: “The paradigmatic assertion in causal relationships is that manipulation of a cause will 
result in the manipulation of an effect” (1979, p. 36). In other words, only causal relationships but 
not mere correlations are exploitable by us in order to bring about a certain outcome (Frisch 
2014). 
There are different manipulability accounts of causation. According to the early versions, 
causal terms need to be reduced to non-causal terms, such as free agency. For instance, Georg 
von Wright states that “to think of a relation between events as causal is to think of it under the 
aspect of (possible) action. It is therefore true, but at the same time a little misleading to say that 
if p is a (sufficient) cause of q, then if I could produce p, I could bring about q. For that p is the 
cause of q.” (von Wright 1971, p. 74). A more recent version of a manipulability account of 
causation is presented by Huw Price (1991) and Peter Menzies and Price (1993), who attempt to 
develop an “agency” theory of causation: “an event A is a cause of a distinct event B just in case 
bringing about the occurrence of A would be an effective means by which a free agent could 
bring about the occurrence of B.” (Menzies and Price 1993, p. 187). The basic premise of this 
approach is that, from an early age, we have direct experience not merely of Humean succession 
of events, but mainly of acting as agents. Therefore, the notion of causation has to be tied to our 
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“personal experience of doing one thing and hence achieving another” (Menzies and Price 1993, 
p. 194). 
These first manipulability versions received several criticisms. On the one hand, they 
were charged of circularity: “doing” and “producing” are already causal notions, which, therefore, 
cannot be legitimately used to define the notion of causation. On the other hand, manipulability is 
an anthropocentric notion; then, the resulting concept of causation is not sufficiently general 
since linked to human manipulation power. For instance, this account would not be able to 
identify the relationship between the gravitational attraction of the moon and the motion of the 
tides on the earth as a causal relation. In other words, the agent-based account of causation is 
inapplicable to causal relationships in which the manipulation of the cause by human beings is 
not practically possible. 
The interventionist version of the manipulability account of causation, developed by 
James Woodward (2003, 2007; see also Pearl 2000), comes to solve those criticisms. Woodward 
notices that the accounts of causation common among non-philosophers, statisticians and 
theorists of experimental design have no reductionist aspirations: causation is a primitive notion 
that cannot be reduced to simpler and more basic concepts (Woodward 2013). Moreover, the 
author points out that causal attributions were traditionally made even before the advent of the 
Galilean idea of natural law (Woodward 2003, p. 171). On this basis, the interventionist approach 
does not intend to define causation in terms of non-causal notions, but to delimitate the domain of 
causation by means of the possibility of control or manipulation: the response to interventions is 
used as a probe to know whether a certain relation is causal or not (Woodward 2003, p. 21). As 
Mathias Frisch puts it, “the results of interventions into a system are a guide to the causal 
structure exhibited by the system” (Frisch 2014, p. 78).  
Woodward’s interventionist proposal “focuses on the purposes or goals behind our 
practices involving causal and explanatory claims; it is concerned with the underlying point of 
our practices” (2003, p. 7). Two elements are central in the proposal: the characterization of 
causal relationships as relating variables, and the notion of “intervention” as an action that 
produces a change in the value of a variable. The former makes possible to identify with 
precision the relata of the relation under scrutiny, and to conceptualize the changes introduced by 
manipulation as changes in the values of the variables (2003, p. 39). In this way, Woodward 
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intends to capture, in non-anthropocentric language, the idea of determining whether X causes Y 
by means of an ideal experimental manipulation of the value of X. 
Informally, regarding the relationship between X and Y, an intervention is a causal and 
exogenous process that modifies the value of X in a specific way: “the intuitive idea is that an 
intervention on X with respect to Y changes the value of X in such a way that if any change 
occurs in Y, it occurs only as a result of change in the value of X and not from some other 
source” (Woodward 2003, p. 14; for a detailed definition, see p. 98). In this case, it can be said 
that the relationship between X and Y is a genuine case of causation. Let us consider the 
following example: in May 22nd, 1960, a very strong earthquake destroyed the city of Valdivia, in 
Chile, where the seismograph recorded 9.5 on its scale. Three two-value variables can be defined: 
E, D and S, whose values 1 represent the occurrence of the earthquake, the destruction of 
Valdivia, and the reading of 9.5 in the seismograph, respectively. If an intervention on E changed 
its value from 1 to 0 (by inhibiting the occurrence of the earthquake) without changing other 
environmental variables, then D and S would also change their values from 1 to 0 (the destruction 
of Valdivia would not occur and the seismograph reading would not be of 9.5, respectively); 
therefore, the relationships between E and D, and between E and S are causal. On the contrary, 
the value of D would not change at all if an intervention on S changed its value from 1 to 0: 
regrettably, the destruction of Valdivia could not have been prevented by an exogenous 
modification of the reading of the seismograph, and this is the indication that the relation between 
D and S is not causal but a mere correlation due to a common cause. 
The interventionist approach to causation explicitly faces the criticisms to the previous 
manipulability views (see Woodward 2013). On the one hand, the circularity criticism does not 
apply. In deciding whether X is a cause of Y, we can use assumptions about the causal 
relationship between other pairs of variables: for instance, the causal relationship between the 
intervention I and the variable X. Of course, this would be unacceptably circular if the aim were 
to define causation by reducing the concept to non-causal notions. But since this is not the 
purpose of the interventionist approach, there is no vicious circularity: the causal assumptions are 
not about the very relationship whose causal nature we are examining. On the other hand, the 
interventionist approach also eludes the charge of anthropocentrism, because the concept of 
intervention should be understood without reference to human action. The consideration of 
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possible interventions admits a counterfactual formulation, which makes sense of causal claims in 
situations where interventions do not occur and even in cases in which they are impossible in 
practice. 
Besides the traditional charges of circularity and anthropocentrism, other criticisms have 
been directed toward the interventionist approach to causation (see Woodward 2013). One of 
them is related with the use of counterfactuals: since the truth conditions for counterfactuals can 
be explained in terms of laws, the appeal to interventions is not necessary (Hiddleston 2005). In 
turn, Nancy Cartwright characterizes the interventionist approach as “operationalist”: it admits a 
single criterion to test causation, and leads to “withhold the concept [of cause] from situations 
that seem the same in all other aspects relevant to its application just because our test cannot be 
applied in those situations” (Cartwright 2002, p. 422). Independently of how appropriate these 
criticisms are, they are directed toward an approach that intends to elucidate the very concept of 
causation. But since our concerns about causation are more modest, we will not address these 
objections: we are not interested in supplying a characterization of causation applicable in every 
circumstance in which the causal talk makes sense. Our only aim here is to explore the possibility 
of appealing to interventionist causation to characterize the informational relation between source 
and destination in a communicational context 
7.- Information, causation and manipulability 
Let us recall that the concept of causation was appealed to with the purpose of preserving a 
physical interpretation of information that does not need a physical interaction or a physical 
carrier that travels through space from source to destination. To this end, the manipulability 
conception of causation, in particular in its interventionist version, seems appropriate. For 
instance, if an argument analogous to that of the Valdivia earthquake is applied to the case of the 
two TV sets considered above, the interventionist perspective will identify as causal precisely 
those relationships in which there is communication (from the transmitter T to TVA and to TVB), 
and will regard the relation between the two TV sets, which cannot be used to communication, as 
a mere correlation. But the main challenge is to apply this approach to teleportation, where there 
seems to be a communicational channel with no physical interaction. 
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The first obstacle to be overcome is related with the application of the interventionist 
version of causation to quantum mechanics, which was explicitly impugned by Woodward: “The 
notion of an intervention with respect to one of the measurement events is not well defined in the 
EPR phenomena, because the distinction between intervening with respect to X and acting 
directly on both X and Y cannot be drawn.” (Hausman and Woodward 1999, p. 566; see also 
2004). Here the issue concerns the ontological interpretation of entangled systems in EPR-type 
experiments: Daniel Hausman and Woodward presuppose ontological holism, according to which 
the two particles of the entangled pair constitute a single composite whole. It is quite clear that, 
from this ontological perspective, there cannot be an intervention upon, say, the spin value a of 
particle A without intervening the spin value b of particle B. In his discussion with the authors, 
Mauricio Suárez proposes to distinguish between the non-separable state of the entangled 
particles and the non-separability of the events involved in the experiment. On this basis, he 
concludes that “whether interventions are available in EPR (and quantum mechanics in general) 
is a complex and contextual question that does not have a unique or uniform answer” and that 
“different combinations of causal hypotheses under test and interpretations of quantum 
mechanics yield different answers to the question.” (2013, p. 199). 
The discussion about the ontology of EPR is highly relevant in the context of the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, although teleportation is based on EPR 
correlations, it is not an EPR-experiment. In fact, Alice not only counts with a particle of the 
entangled pair, but has access also to the state χ  to be teleported, and to the two two-state 
classical systems needed to send the two bits of information through the classical channel. Since 
communication requires those three elements, the intervention does not need to act on the 
entangled pair, but it can operate on the other two elements. For instance, the intervention on 
Alice’s end may change the state to be teleported, from χ  to ϕ : as a consequence, something 
changes in Bob’s end, since he will recover ϕ  and not χ . Or the intervention might block one 
of the classical systems that Alice sends to Bob: in this case, Bob would be unable to recover the 
teleported state. It is worth stressing that we can be sure about the consequences of these 
interventions independently of whether the entangled pair is interpreted as a single holistic 
system or not.  
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Although interventionism gives a clear answer to the charge of anthropocentrism, in the 
application of this approach to interpreting the concept of information, anthropocentrism is not an 
issue: here we are not interested in the moon causing tides or in the motion of tectonic plates 
causing earthquakes. Our context of interest is very limited, since confined to cases of 
communication, in which there is always a deliberate intervention on the source of information 
with the purpose to change the state of the destination. Moreover, Cartwright’s worries are 
beyond our limited scope: the fact that the interventionist concept of cause cannot be applied in 
certain relevant causal situations is not a problem if those situations do not involve 
communication. In our case, causation is used only as a probe tool to know whether there is 
transmission of information or not in the communicational context, independently of signals and 
interactions between source and destination. 
Regarding the objection to the use of counterfactuals, it is also innocuous in our context of 
interest. In fact, counterfactuals are introduced in the interventionist approach to deal with cases 
where the intervention on the cause is physically or practically impossible. But in situations of 
transmission of information the interventions on the source are always physically and practically 
possible. Even more, since the messages to be transmitted are embodied in sequences of the states 
of the source, the possibility of controlling the state of the source is an essential requirement for 
communication: the nature of communication itself includes that possibility; it makes no sense to 
conceive a source of information whose states cannot be modified. 
It is worth emphasizing again that here it is not argued that the manipulability approach is 
the right or the best theory of causation, which accounts for all conceivable cases of causation. 
The discussion of this point is not relevant for our argumentation, since our aim is more limited: 
we appeal to a manipulability view of causation only to disentangle the problems related with the 
interpretation of the concept of information in the communicational context. 
Summing up, the interventionist version of the manipulability approach to causation seems 
to be a productive resource to preserve a physical interpretation of information in the 
communicational context in the face of the difficulties introduced by quantum-assisted 
communication. In particular, it eludes the bizarre answers given by those who try to retain for 
teleportation an explanation in terms of physical interactions or signals travelling through space 
and time. Moreover, it agrees with the intuitive idea that communication not only involves 
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correlations, but also essentially requires the possibility of changing the state of the destination by 
manipulating the state of the source. 
8.- Conclusions 
Among the many different discursive domains in which the concept of information plays a 
significant role, this work has focused on the communicational context, perhaps the traditional 
context to talk about information, where two interpretations of the concept were distinguished. It 
has been shown that the epistemic interpretation of information, although possibly useful in 
scientific or philosophical studies about human knowledge, does not incorporate the essential 
asymmetric feature of communication: what happens in the source of information must produce 
modifications on what happens in the destination. The physical interpretation does not suffer of 
this shortcoming, to the extent it that conceives information as something physical, that can be 
generated at one point of the physical space and transmitted to another point, that can be 
accumulated, stored and converted from one form to another. From this traditional viewpoint, 
information is always transferred by means of a physical mean: source and destination must be 
linked through a physical signal that carries the information. However, this interpretation faces 
serious difficulties to deal with teleportation, the typical case studied in the field of quantum-
assisted communication: although Alice succeeds in the transmission of the information 
corresponding to the teleported state, there is no carrier of that information that travels from the 
source to the destination following a continuous space-time path. For this reason, some authors 
decided to reject the physical interpretation and to adopt a deflationist view of information, which 
dissolves the problem of the interpretation of the concept. 
The challenge of this work has been to retain the view of information as a physical 
magnitude, but dispensing with the requirement of a physical carrier for its transmission. It has 
been argued that a way to reach this purpose is to exploit a basic and intuitive idea behind the 
concept of communication: the idea of causation, the intuition that a change in the state of the 
source must produce a change in the destination. Of course, no concept of causation based on 
physical interactions is useful to that purpose, since it would amount to come back to the 
traditional physical interpretation of information. By contrast, the manipulability approach to 
causation, in its interventionist version, seems to be the appropriate conceptual resource to deal 
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with the problem. From this perspective, the essential feature of causation is the capability of 
controlling the effect by manipulating the cause, independently of whether there is a physical 
interaction between the cause and the effect. A physical interpretation of information tied to this 
view of causation seems to be the suitable tool for picking up all the cases usually conceived as 
communication situations and only them.  
In short, if it is accepted that “no information without causation”, and causation is 
conceived in manipulabilist terms, the slogan becomes “no information without manipulation.” 
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